Revisiting Union Decline: An Analysis of Organized Labor\u27s Crisis by Meyers, Nathan
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst 
Masters Theses Dissertations and Theses 
March 2016 
Revisiting Union Decline: An Analysis of Organized Labor's Crisis 
Nathan Meyers 
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/masters_theses_2 
Recommended Citation 
Meyers, Nathan, "Revisiting Union Decline: An Analysis of Organized Labor's Crisis" (2016). Masters 
Theses. 328. 
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/masters_theses_2/328 
This Campus-Only Access for Five (5) Years is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and 
Theses at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized 












Submitted to the Graduate School of the 
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 





















© Copyright by Nathan Meyers 2016 




REVISITING UNION DECLINE: AN ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZED LABOR’S 
CRISIS, 1970-2008 
 





Approved as to style and content by:  
 
______________________________ 
Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Chair  
______________________________ 
Tom Juravich, Member  
______________________________ 






Michelle Budig, Department Head  











NATHAN MEYERS, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN DEARBORN 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Donald Tomaskovic-Devey 
I explore the sources of union decline from 1970-2008, inspecting the shifting 
prominence of different causes at different points in time.  Using a relational approach 
which views labor and capital as actors that gain or lose power at the expense of each 
other, I find that U.S. union decline is the result of several institutional transformations 
that benefitted capital relative to labor.  Capital was advantaged and labor was 
disadvantaged due to: 1) the financialization of the economy in the 1980s, 2) weakening 
protections of labor policy by the 1970s, 3) the reconfiguration of productive capital in 
the 1970s and 1980s, 4) an anti-union business offensive gaining momentum in the 
1970s, and 5) the failure of unions to sufficiently organize new members throughout the 
entire period.  Combined, this confluence of factors led to a steep decline in union 
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REVISITING UNION DECLINE 
U.S. unions have been in crisis for the past 35 years.  Beginning around 1980, 
U.S. union density levels plummeted and many labor unions struggled to survive.  
Organized labor had enjoyed a fairly secure existence for most of the previous half 
century, but political and economic currents carved a new institutional landscape upon 
which established bargaining patterns crumbled.  The peak density level for private sector 
union membership was 37% and occurred in 1953.  Since then, private-sector 
membership levels have dwindled to 6.6%. The public sector—which became heavily 
unionized beginning in the 1960s—maintains membership levels of 35%2.  Total union 
membership, however, continued to increase through the 1970s before plummeting in the 
early 1980s.  By 2008, absolute union membership was only 49% of its peak 1979 levels.  
Between 1979 and 1983 alone, organized labor lost 35.5% of its private-sector 
membership, a large and drastic change to the national economy and the power of US 
workers.  Figure 1 shows trends in private-sector union membership in the productive 





                                                 





Figure 1: Private-Sector Unionization, 1970-2008 
 
 The decline of unionism has been socially destructive. Union workers have 
historically been paid significantly more than non-union workers (Freeman and Medoff 
1984; Brady et al. 2013; Rosenfeld 2014), so the decline of unionization has been a major 
contributor to increased inequality in the United States (Wallace et al. 1999; Western and 
Rosenfeld 2011; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013; Hacker and Pierson 2010a).  Part of 
this rising inequality, as union density has decreased, is exhibited by increasing rates of 
poverty (Brady et al. 2013) and a shrinking middle class (Reich 2007). Unemployment 
benefits have suffered as a result of waning union power (Gordon 2015). Perhaps most 
importantly, unions are no longer able to shape pay standards for non-union workers 
across the private economy (Rosenfeld 2014). Politically, the absence of labor unions has 
meant lower voter turnout and political participation (Kerrissey and Schofer 2013).  All 
of these have been outcomes of organized labor’s declining bargaining power and the 
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Many potential causes of the decline of organized labor have been proposed.  
Most authors have attributed the factors of union decline to single causes—or only 
highlight one cause at the expense of others—such as the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB, Bronfenbrenner 2009), computerization (Kristal 2013), Ronald Reagan (Tope 
and Jacobs 2009; Jacobs and Myers 2014), lack of labor militancy (Aronowitz 2014), the 
political mobilization of the business community (Hacker and Pierson 2010a; Walker and 
Rea 2014; Mizruchi 2013), the failure of unions to organize (Mills 1948; Barkin 1961; 
Fletcher and Gapasin 2008), or deindustrialization via increasing capital mobility 
(Bluestone and Harrison 1982).  Other scholars have listed various causes of decline, but 
do not articulate how they occur as interdependent social processes that interact spatially 
and temporally (Fiorito and Maranto 1987; Clawson and Clawson 1999; Freeman and 
Medoff 1984; Goldfield 1987).  Still, others have offered an internationalist perspective 
that limits context for the sake of comparison (Western 1995, 1997; Misra and Hicks 
1994).  While each of these authors contributes something valuable, few explore how this 
complex set of factors has interacted to form a broader social force (for exceptions in 
other labor and work literature, see Dixon 2008; Haydu 1998; Tilly and Tilly 1998).  In 
this regard, faulting the individual studies is a misplaced critique; however, faulting the 
field for undervaluing the complexity of social dynamics seems appropriate. 
The nature of union strength rests on many foundations, which shift and affect 
each other in a variety of ways.  As this paper demonstrates, multiple factors have 
interacted with each other to cause private-sector union density decline since 1953 and 
membership decline since 1979, with a particularly sharp decline in the early 1980s that 





union decline, there are several gaps to be addressed, namely the failure to address how 
different factors became more or less prominent over time, the relational aspects 
associated with union decline, and a lack of strong theoretical analyses situating union 
decline within a broader institutional framework.  In short, a more complete analysis of 
union decline is necessary to truly understand organized labor’s rise, fall, and potential 
resurrection within the U.S. context.   
Labor did not exert its power when it could have, while capital continually did.  
Preserving power in relation to capital could have been a goal for the labor movement 
decades before the crisis.  However, due to legal barriers and a strategic focus on more 
immediate concerns, most unions lacked the foresight to act accordingly.  The sudden 
shock of the 1980s drastically reduced the labor movement’s power to respond to present 
or future challenges, suppressing unions by fundamentally changing their status relative 
to employers.  Changes usually occur slowly, so given its sudden loss of clout, the labor 
movement has taken many years attempting to regain its composure and rebuild its lost 
status in American society.  Likewise, business and political interests increasingly 
intensified their suppression of unionism as they gained power. 
A relational and institutional approach is necessary for understanding union 
decline.  By this, I mean that the power of institutional actors can only be understood in 
relation to one another.  Many factors might be considered when reviewing the 
fundamental challenges to U.S. unions, but discussion in this paper will be limited to 
macro- and organizational-level processes that affected capital-labor relations.  Five 
institutional processes will be analyzed through an organizational lens; that is, with a 





processes at the organizational level.  They are: 1) legislative policy drift by the 1970s, 2) 
the reconfiguration of productive capital in the 1970s and 1980s, 3) a business 
mobilization and offensive against unions gaining momentum in the 1970s, 4) the failure 
of unions to adequately organize throughout the entire period, and 5) the financialization 
of the economy beginning in the 1980s.  The first four are the primary types of 
explanations drawn from the existing literature, while financialization has yet to be 
examined in depth.  To support my argument, I examine private-sector, industry-year 
dynamics from 1970-2008. 
The five types of explanations are based on the different types of actors involved 
in labor-capital relations.  Legislative policy drift pertains to changes in the effects of 
state policy over time.  The reconfiguration of productive capital refers to systemic 
changes to capital.  The political mobilization and business offensive refers to employers’ 
strategies to intensify opposition to unionism both politically and in the workplace.  The 
failure of unions to organize enough workers encompasses organized labor’s role in the 
crisis.  Finally, financialization specifies the growth of finance in the economy.  
Together, these explanations explain the relational nature of capital labor power 
struggles. 
By using industry-level panel data for year 1970-2008, I am able to employ 
locally-weighted regression equations to examine temporal variation in each of my five 
explanations.  In doing so, the prominence of each explanation is examined in different 
time periods.  This enables complex social processes to be disentangled and a relational 





The Relational Approach to Inequality 
Relational Inequality Theory (RIT, Avent-Holt and Tomaskovic-Devey 2014; 
Tomaskovic-Devey 2014) provides a useful theoretical perspective for interpreting union 
decline.  In this framework, categorical distinctions—i.e. specific relational 
classifications— between actors are necessary for understanding how actors interact.  
When the manner in which organizational resources are generated or disbursed is 
reshaped, existing patterns of resource allocation can be upset, allowing actors the 
opportunity to engage in a process of claims making to gain access to new or existing 
resources.  Claims making is a central mechanism in this model, comprised of a two-step 
process that involves: 1) an actor making claims on resources and 2) other actors 
verifying or contesting the initial actor’s actors claim (Avent-Holt and Tomaskovic-
Devey 2014).  Of course, these actors must be in a position to stake claims in the first 
place.  Pertinent examples of claims making in this context might be labor unions 
demanding higher wages from employers or employers refusing to bargain with unions.  
These claims are not always direct contestations, as opponents can make claims by trying 
to erode each other’s bases of power through legislative or other efforts rather than 
directly confronting each other (Dixon 2008).   
In the 1970s and 1980s, the reshaping of the U.S. economy enabled business to 
stake claims on resources previously held by unions.  This occurred through 
concessionary demands and a general hostility towards acknowledging labor as a 
legitimate organizational stakeholder.  Employers actively sought to weaken unions by 
reallocating capital and lobbying for deregulation, tactics that sought to weaken 





framework.  These efforts can be viewed as attempts of one organizational stakeholder to 
lay claim to the resources currently held by another.  In this case, organized labor and 
capital make claims to assert their legitimate control over the workplace. 
Institutional transformations shape the way contestations occur within 
workplaces. While organizational settings are the points at which claims occur, they are 
always nested in institutional contexts.  Events that happen at specific workplaces can be 
disseminated to other workplaces, creating an institutional phenomenon.  At the same 
time, national trends developed by the state, social movements, or the legitimation of 
institutional phenomena can disseminate new practices across an organizational field 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The dispersion of these social changes affects the field of 
contestation between capital and organized labor, the effects of which are visible at the 
workplace/bargaining level.  Capital and labor contest each other in an iterative manner--
providing temporal dynamics— where the product of power and institutional forces at 
one point in time is a function of how transformations occur at earlier points in time. 
The workplace (i.e. the organizational level) is the ultimate point of contestation, 
where all influences— global and local, political and economic, external and internal— 
converge to influence outcomes of the struggle between workers and employers.   
Institutional factors present themselves in workplace contestations, but are not 
necessarily created within the workplaces where contestations occur.  These factors 
contribute to the effectiveness of business and labor union strategies by altering power 
dynamics between capital and labor, directing— rather than determining— the outcomes 
themselves.  For example, deindustrialization has directly led to workplace closings and 





composition of the workforce have diluted areas with heavy union concentrations and 
relocated employment away from these areas.  The business offensive, signifying the end 
of the so-called capital-labor accord of the postwar economy, occurred as employers 
increased their anti-union tactics and coopted the National Labor Relations Board to 
impede labor from organizing new workplaces.   
Potential power can increase or decrease depending on institutional or 
organizational settings, but must be mobilized or manipulated to become actuated 
(Roscigno 2011).  Even though decades of iterations in capital-labor contestations have 
tended to favor capital, the increasing complexity of production processes have increased 
capital-labor interdependence, which potentially increases the potential power of the 
labor movement (Piven 2007).  While this is yet to be realized, union decline and other 
power processes should be considered ebbing and flowing rather than as a linear process 
(Silver 2003; Polanyi 1944).  With this general theoretical perspective in mind, I will 
explore the major causes of union decline in the literature. 
Explanation 1: Labor Policy 
Federal labor law changed very little for private-sector workers in the several 
decades preceding the 1980s.  Despite this, the effect of established policies did change 
as other changes to relational power transpired.  Policy drift (Hacker and Pierson 2010a) 
occurs when political actors use conscious inaction as a method of achieving their goals 
as former policies become outdated, but remain in effect (also see Mills 1948 for an 
earlier description of drift).  In the case of the current industrial relations policy—as 





employers ended the accord, no longer finding bargaining under the established system to 
be in their best interests.  While this might have been true, employers were assisted by the 
conscious efforts of politicians (increasingly aided by corporate lobbyists) who 
consciously failed to update NLRA as other institutional changes undermined the 
foundations of legislation that once lent strength to organized labor.   
 Although not the first piece of labor relations to emerge from the Great 
Depression-era, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, or the Wagner Act, 
has been the foundation of U.S. labor relations policy since its inception.  The earlier 
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 was ruled unconstitutional in May 1935, just 
before the Wagner Act was passed in July of that year.  NIRA was an effort to create 
governmentalized business-labor cartels in efforts to promote mutual solidarity, but had 
failed due to both the lack of union power at the time and opposition from many 
conservatives who opposed the institutionalization of organized labor (Mills 1948).  
Unlike its predecessor, the Wagner Act survived legal challenges, but has been weakened 
over time. 
 Once passed, the Wagner Act guaranteed workers throughout most of the private 
sector with the right to unionize free from employer interference and to collectively 
bargain with employers over the conditions of their employment.3  A governmental 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was established, placing the U.S. federal 
government in a role as third-party mediator to capital-labor disputes, or as a third actor 
in a relational conceptualization of labor relations.  This third-party involvement by the 
                                                 
3 The earlier Norris-Laguardia Act of 1932 had already prevented employers from petitioning courts to file 





government enabled employees to file unfair labor practices against their employers, 
while also providing an arbiter (NLRB) to ensure that employers bargained in good faith.    
Following Wagner, union membership boomed. 
Many anti-union politicians opposed NLRA provisions from their start, finding 
the political opportunity to amend the legislation shortly after World War II.  Overriding 
President Truman’s veto, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act of 1947 into 
law, more commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act.  Provisions limiting labor tactics 
included the reinstatement of court injunctions to limit strike activity; making secondary 
boycotts4 unfair labor practices, a ban on wildcat strikes5, and a ban on sympathy strikes.  
Anti-union legislation was enabled by granting states the ability to pass laws banning 
union security agreements (these are known as Right-to-Work laws, but they enable 
employees to opt out of paying union dues while retaining union benefits).  Employers 
were granted the ability to hold captive audience meetings and the “free speech” clause 
enabling employers the ability to vocally oppose the union so long as they did not 
interfere with unionization efforts.   Union leaders became required to make anti-
communist pledges to remain legally recognized.  In 1959, Congress again amended the 
NLRA through the Landrum-Griffin Act, which further restricted secondary boycotts and 
required the disclosure of union financial documents. 
Although the Taft-Hartley Act placed restrictions on union activities, many 
workers— who opposed the law after union leaderships likened it to “slave labor”— 
began to feel less strongly after several years passed without drastic consequences to their 
                                                 
4 Secondary boycotts are a type of labor tactic in which a secondary firm in a target company’s supply 
chain is boycotted as a means of leveraging the target firm. 





employment conditions (Lubell 1954).  As one textile cutter belonging to the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, who originally opposed the Taft-Hartley Act, claimed a 
few years after the Act’s passage, “I’m for it now…There have been fewer strikes.  When 
other workers strike, business drops and we get laid off (1954:204-05).”  As this cutter’s 
experience illustrates, much of the damage done to unions by Taft-Hartley had originally 
occurred in the form of limitations on tactics and organizing, rather than immediate 
adverse effects on the everyday experiences of workers within those unions.  After all, 
growing union power seemed to continue growing at the outset of the law.  These 
limitations on union operations eventually affected workers in real, tangible ways, but the 
immediate linkage to the effects of legislation was not immediately apparent. 
There is no question as to whether Taft-Hartley constrained union organizing 
efforts; in fact, it was designed to limit the economic pressures that unions could impose 
on employers (Getman and Pogrebin 1988).  However, its effects were both immediate 
and long-ranging.  Immediately, unions were limited in their tactics as secondary 
boycotts and wildcat strikes became forbidden and employers’ regained the ability to 
seek court injunctions limiting strike activities.  Unions confronted the possibility of anti-
union, Right-to-Work laws refocusing organizing efforts away from employers, towards 
state politics and retaining individual dues payers within the union.  Many leftists were 
purged from unions due to the legislation’s anti-communist clause, making the labor 
movement much more conservative.  All of this mattered little as long as a capital-labor 
accord was in place.  
Unions seemingly thrived for decades after Taft-Hartley was enacted, despite 





gradual decline in union density after 1953.  The sudden decline in union strength in the 
1980s, I argue, is partly based on a temporal reemergence of the importance of the 
limiting factors stemming from Taft-Hartley.  Unions may have been restricted by the 
law throughout the postwar era, but the institutional circumstances of collective 
bargaining in the United States at that time had allowed unions to remain strong.  When 
other structural changes in the economy transformed the landscape upon which organized 
labor contested employers, the restrictions of Taft-Hartley became a much larger burden 
on unions.  While other factors were also responsible for organized labor’s decline, the 
collapse of established bargaining norms across many industries required unions to 
engage in alternative tactics, but many possible options were illegal or limited.  In effect, 
organized labor had lost many tools from its repertoire at a time when many of them were 
not vital to the survival of unionism; when new problems required usage of those old 
tools, they were nowhere to be found in labor’s limited repertoire. 
    Though Taft-Hartley became more destructive in the 1980s than it was in the 
1940s, Wagner also became less effective than it had been in previous years.  Hacker and 
Pierson’s (2010a) concept of policy drift is applicable to the evolution of the Wagner 
Act—as the foundations of U.S. political economy shifted over time, a once effective 
piece of legislation became outdated.  After passage, Wagner had catalyzed a spectacular 
growth in union membership, but years later, administrative appointments of an all pro-
business National Labor Relations Board and the downfall of established bargaining 
patterns had become new obstacles to union success (Kochan et al. 1986).  For this 
reason, a return to the Wagner version of NLRA would be necessary, but not sufficient, 





Policy Drift Hypothesis: Union membership declined over time as existing labor law 
became less supportive of unionism 
Explanation 2: The Reconfiguration of Productive Capital 
A reconfiguration of productive capital preceded the decline of union power in the 
1980s.  Comprising five primary moments, this reconfiguration included: 1) a 
deindustrialization of regions containing unionized workforces and heavy industry, 2) the 
rapid growth of the services sector, 3) a rise in global competition causing a reduction in 
investments in domestic goods production, 4) the wide-scale automation of production, 
and 5) an increased reliance on college-educated workers.  Together, these factors may 
have destabilized the capital-labor accord of the early postwar era. 
Massive layoffs began as the 1970s experienced crisis and economic stagnation.  
The postwar economic engine ceased to produce the prosperity that many businesses 
came to expect.  At the same time, new technologies enabled unprecedented levels of 
capital mobility, allowing capital to flee to new industries and locations, particularly from 
domestic heavy industry and the unionized Northeast and Midwestern states (Bluestone 
and Harrison 1982; Miller and Tomaskovic-Devey 1983).  Bluestone and Harrison (1982) 
estimated that 38 million jobs were lost during the 1970s  as businesses engaged in 
practices of disinvestment and capital flight away from unions—a process characterized 
by the reallocation of investments away from revenue sources, non-investment in the 
maintenance of existing machinery, the physical relocation of capital equipment, and the 
complete relocations of factories.  At the same time, global competition increased as 
foreign markets developed and U.S. capital chased new investment opportunities.  This 





This considerable shift in the employment structure of the U.S. economy is also 
reflected in changes to a more service-oriented economy (Miller and Tomaskovic-Devey 
1983).  Most job loss occurred in the manufacturing sector, as those jobs could be more 
easily moved to regions of the country or world where labor was cheaper and unions 
nonexistent (see Silver 2003), fostering the transition to a more  service-oriented 
economy as job growth concentrated mostly in the service sector.  Likewise, continual 
productivity gains in manufacturing meant fewer workers were necessary to perform the 
same tasks. This process was further driven by new capitalist demands for the freer flow 
of capital across international borders, thereby creating demands for more financial 
malleability of international capital (Harvey 2005), which further enabled job destruction 
and industrial reconfiguration in the U.S. as these demands bore fruition.  Since union 
strength had been strongest in the manufacturing sector and in the Northeast and 
Midwest, the sudden onslaught of layoffs eliminated union jobs, directly reducing union 
membership. 
The spatial and sectoral reorganization of work within the U.S. might also explain 
union decline.  Many jobs were eliminated, but the total number of U.S jobs increased.  
Western (1997) is critical of the idea that changes to the industrial structure have been 
purely negative.  He argues that a disaggregated analysis of unionization by industry is 
necessary to make this argument.  Rather than contributing to union decline, changes in 
the industrial structure may have simply caused a shift in union strength towards some 
industries and away from others.  While density levels have fallen uniformly across 
industries in the U.S., some of the effects of such a shift might be partially taken into 





The geographic shift of industries from heavily-unionized states to low-union 
Right-to-Work states may be a major example of the changing industrial structure, 
leading to union decline (Rao et al. 2011; Hogler et al. 2004).  Since employment growth 
in RTW states is an indicator of deindustrialization and capital flight from states with 
stronger labor laws, the geographic reconfiguration of employment demonstrates the 
relational nature of workplace contestations.  Employment in the United States did not 
shrink, but its overall composition did change.  Given the destruction of employment in 
Northern manufacturing and the growth of employment in the RTW states, capital flight 
may have been responsible for much of U.S. union decline. 
Capital Flight Hypothesis: Capital flight away from states with strong labor laws caused 
union decline. 
 
Increasing global competition was likely a driver of union decline.  Historically, 
firms actively avoid unions by diverting investments when possible (Silver 2003).  The 
decentralization of global economic activity across the postwar era (Clawson and 
Clawson 1999) was a likely result of employers fleeing heavily-unionized regions in 
favor of cheaper labor.  Increasing import penetration in the goods-producing sector 
provides support for this argument, as this means that Americans increasingly consumed 
foreign goods, leading to declining unionization as domestic production diminished. 
Global Competition Hypothesis: An influx of global competition undermined union 
employment 
 
The size and physical organization of the workplace might also influence union 





sensitive or spatially isolated (Kimeldorf 2013).  Silver (2003) discusses how technical 
and organizational fixes enable employers to hinder union formation within a workplace.  
For instance, as Silver notes, workers in a continuous-process automobile plant have 
much more ability to shut down an entire facility with a strike than do workers in a textile 
factory who each tend to their individual looms, simply because autos on a production 
line must be assembled in a specific order and textiles do not require sequential 
assemblage.  Management is keenly aware of this and attempts to dilute this type of 
power with technical and organizational fixes such as increased use of computers and 
robotic equipment, segmentation of different departments into various puppet companies 
within the same workplace, phantom employment practices (the absence of management, 
common in janitorial work), and the flexibilization of employment through contracted 
employment and the other precarious types of employment (Silver 2003; also see Batt 
2001). 
Another major way workplaces have been reorganized is through a process of 
technological change, or automation, which has increased dramatically since the early 
1970s.  The increasing automation of production may have driven union decline (Reich 
2007).  Kristal (2013) argues that the computerization of the economy has been a primary 
driver of union decline, resulting from factor-biased technological change (i.e. 
computerization has benefitted capitalists more than workers) and class-biased 
technological change (i.e. computerization has provided capital with increased ability to 
suppress unionism) in which employers consciously automate workplaces to reduce 
worker power.  Rather than taking power into account, as Kristal does, the skill-biased 





natural process that weakened labor unions by providing highly-trained workers the 
agency to bargain individually and reducing the bargaining leverage of lesser-trained 
workers (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Autor 2003).  Complementing Kristal's theoretical 
perspective, Hanley (2014) claims that SBTC is undermined when a relational approach 
is used to understand technological change, as occurs when employers use technological 
advancement to stake claims on their managerial authority.  Regardless of theoretical 
perspective, previous literature has mostly viewed automation as a threat to the existence 
of labor unions. 
Technological Change Hypothesis: The automation of workplaces reduced union 
membership, but the effect is greatest in the manufacturing sector 
 
The changing economy has led to a higher demand for workers with college 
educations.  Mosher (2007) claims that the increasing college premium in the 1980s was 
the result of union decline. Having a bachelor’s degree certainly provides many workers 
the option to change jobs without starting from the bottom of a new career ladder, unlike 
most blue collar jobs.  This may lead some workers to believe that this type of leverage is 
enough to allow them to bargain individually rather than collectively.  Another possibility 
is that college educated workers tend to have better working conditions and less cause for 
grievance than other workers.  While these possibilities cannot be examined here, the 
rising employment of the college educated on union membership can be analyzed. 
College Education Hypothesis: A rising proportion of the workforce with bachelor’s 






As all of these broad changes to productive capital transformed the domestic 
economy, power relations between labor and capital were fundamentally altered.  
Capitalists benefitted from these transformations, likely driving union decline.  Organized 
labor became disempowered, leaving unions more vulnerable to the actions of employers.  
Many capitalists took advantage of their renewed strength. 
Explanation 3: Political Mobilization and the Business Offensive 
During the 1970s, two major transformations to the behavior of capitalists 
transpired.  First, the business elite politically mobilized as an interest group.  Second, 
employers engaged in an anti-union business offensive, becoming more openly hostile to 
the practice of collective bargaining.  These two processes occurred in tandem, but the 
business offensive required the advancement of political goals before becoming fully 
successful. 
Businesses mobilized to confront labor unions directly at firm and industrial 
levels, but they also collectively organized to influence the national institutional 
landscape.  Earlier views on the business offensive focused largely on the role that 
employers played in fighting union efforts, but a proliferation of literature on the business 
mobilization has emerged in recent years (Mizruchi 2013; Walker and Rea 2014; Hacker 
and Pierson 2010a,  2010b).  Scholars have sought institutional explanations to account 
for the disparities created by the political system, which have inevitably led to an 
inspection of public policy and a resulting examination of how the decline of organized 





 The bases of political support for business interests must be recognized to 
understand how their new political coalition was established.  Responding to political 
backlash from the social movements of the 1960s (Frank 2003), economic crisis in the 
early 1970s (Mizruchi 2013; Bluestone and Harrison 1982), and uncertainty over the 
future, some Americans sought to return to 1950s-era glory by confronting the imagined 
moral decay sweeping over the country, robbing the U.S. of the greatness achieved 
through hard work and sacrifice since World War II.  Many labor-supporting Old Leftists 
felt alienated by many of the New Left’s social justice causes that seemed divorced from 
labor issues (Frank 2003).  Republicans successfully split the New Deal coalition by 
harnessing the resentment of Southern whites in years following the 1960s civil rights 
legislation (Hacker and Pierson 2010b).  The rise of the religious conservatism in 
Republican politics catered to the moral decay arguments in the stagnant 1970s (2010b).  
Following the turmoil of the 1960s an emergent radical right also appeared on the 
political scene (Blee and Creasap 2010; Epstein and Forster 1967).  Harnessing these 
various cultural groups was essential for business interests seeking to gain influence as 
the American political landscape reconfigured. 
 Business became mobilized as these processes took place. Shortly before his 
nomination to the Supreme Court by the Nixon administration in 1971, then attorney and 
chair of the Education Committee of the Chamber of Commerce Lewis Powell penned a 
letter to the Chamber of Commerce calling for the business community to tap into its 
unused organizational potential to combat what he perceived as an attack on the free 
enterprise system.  This included a call for the development of conservative responses to 





Hacker and Pierson 2010b).  Even if this memo echoed sentiments already present in the 
business community, Powell’s call to arms and subsequent judicial appointment to the 
U.S. Supreme Court were signifiers of an emerging activism within organized business 
interests. 
Though the goals of restoring American enterprise to its pre-Depression form are 
wide-ranging, one primary aspect was the business community’s view that organized 
labor was one of the primary impediments to this vision.  The Business Roundtable 
formed in 1972 as a collection of CEOs sought to advance the political interests of 
American business (Walker and Rea 2014; Mizruchi 2013; Hacker and Pierson 2010a).  
Mostly unstudied until recent years, the policy-drafting American Legislative Exchange 
Council (ALEC) was formed in 1973 by conservatives seeking to change the political 
tides in response to Left successes of the 1960s.  Conservative think tanks mobilized to 
develop intellectual alternatives to the messaging of organized labor and the New Left—
these included the already existing American Enterprise Institute (AEI) (Mizruchi 2013; 
Medvetz 2006) and Hoover Institution, as well as newly funded think tanks such as the 
Heritage Foundation founded in 1973 (Gross et al. 2013), the Cato Institute founded in 
1977, and the Manhattan Institute founded in 1978 (Medvetz 2006).  Other preexisting 
business interest organizations actively opposing unions were the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the National Federation of Independent Businesses, and the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce (Walker and Rea 2014; Mizruchi 2013; Hacker and Pierson 
2010a).  These organizations all played active roles in undermining the strength of the 





 Mobilization within the business community meant that businesses played a more 
active role in developing policy and influencing elections.  Another significant way 
capitalists mobilized was through the development of a conservative media organizations 
(first print media, then radio in the 1980s, television in the 1990s, and web-based media 
in the 21st century) and cultural alternatives that business-friendly politicians could use 
as tools to promote or pursue their agendas (Jamieson and Cappella 2008).  Other ways 
might be through alternative knowledge-producing systems such as the think tanks 
described above (Gross et al. 2013; Medvetz 2006). 
 The political mobilization of business in the 1970s produced the political space 
for the simultaneously-occurring business offensive. While a product of broader political 
forces, the business offensive clearly occurred at the workplace level.  This includes 
enhanced and increased union prevention tactics pursued by employers and attempts to 
use the NLRB as a tool for preventing union certification elections, or enabling 
decertification elections.    The business offensive had two primary components: 1) the 
use of anti-union intimidation tactics on the part of employers and 2) the use of the 
NLRB as a tool to actively thwart union efforts (see Bronfenbrenner 2009).  The results 
of NLRB elections are measurable and, ultimately, responsible for labor’s success in 
organizing. 
Employer opposition to unions has probably played a role in the decline in union 
strength.  Although many— if not most—employers never fully embraced the idea of 
organized labor in their workplaces, employer opposition towards unions markedly 
increased for two decades before the 1980s (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Clawson and 





“The vehemence of the employer mobilization suggests that the accord may never have 
been as fully accepted by capital as many had supposed, that instead capital may simply 
have recognized the strength of labor and concluded that certain kinds of opposition were 
not [then] feasible.”  Evidence of this is found in the attempts of management to break 
the Steelworkers union during their prolonged strike in 1959 (Metzgar 2000) or the 
efforts of eventual Phelps Dodge CEO Richard Moolick to bust unions in the 1950s and 
1960s, decades before eventually working to bust the copper miners’ union after 
becoming CEO of Phelps Dodge in 1982 (Rosenblum 1997).  Others argue that this 
accord existed, but was only pragmatic, a product of its own time, and by no means 
universally accepted by management (Mills 1948; Kochan et al. 1986; Mizruchi 2013).  
Regardless of how one views the existence of an accord, anti-union sentiment always 
existed within the business community and the intensity of active employer opposition to 
unions changed by the 1980s. 
Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) landmark study, What Do Unions Do?, illustrates 
how union success rates in NLRB elections had deteriorated beginning in the mid-1950s, 
continuing into the late 1970s, when the private-sector success rate in NLRB elections 
dropped below 25 percent.  They also mention that employers contest nearly every NLRB 
election, conduct anti-union campaigns, fire union activists, and bargain in bad faith over 
contracts when unionization occurs.  Beginning in the 1960s, employers’ use of illegal 
tactics and disregard for labor law increased (1984).  As Freeman and Medoff (1984: 
233) claimed, “managerial opposition to unionism, and illegal campaign tactics in 
particular, are a major, if not the major, determinant of NLRB election results.” Since this 





employer behavior changed prior to the 1980s as much as or more than NLRB behavior.  
Although employers clearly disregarded the threat of unfair labor practice (ULP) rulings 
as the business offensive began (Freeman 2011), the national increase in ULP claims 
submitted against employers coincides with the intensification of employers’ animosity 
towards organized labor. 
Some work has sought to contextualize the historical origins leading to the 
increasing hostility of employers and the increased prevalence of using NLRB elections 
to prevent unionization (Bronfenbrenner 2009).  Recent work has attributed the decline of 
unions to the anti-union NLRB appointed by President Ronald Reagan (Tope and Jacobs 
2009; to a lesser extent Jacobs and Myers 2014).  Reagan appointed an all pro-business 
board, but worth mentioning is that NLRBs of previous presidential administrations had 
never been decidedly pro-labor (Barkin 1961).  Some of this work also attributes 
Reagan’s 1981 firing of over 11,000 air traffic controllers from PATCO—a public-sector 
union whose employees were terminated by Reagan after conducting an illegal strike— 
as a moment that emboldened employers to embrace an anti-union strategy (see McCartin 
2011 for a history).  These beliefs are common in the labor movement, but fail to 
properly contextualize the broader structural changes taking place in the years prior to 
Reagan’s election, such as the origins of economic financialization and several 
deregulatory acts passed by Congress under the Carter administration (Miller and 
Tomaskovic-Devey 1983), the political mobilization of business (Hacker and Pierson 
2010a), as well as the increase in employer-contested NLRB elections and anti-union 





 Rather than going on the offensive as the result of administrative power or 
charisma from the executive branch, others have attributed the business offensive to 
changing economic conditions of the time.  For instance, Kleiner (2001) points to 
employers eventually realizing the perceived high benefits and low costs of suppressing 
union activity.  Kochan et al. (1986) explain that, after decades of stable bargaining 
conditions under the guidelines set by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (the 
Wagner Act), management decided that it was no longer committed to bargaining 
faithfully with unions, even as organized labor remained committed to the established, 
yet outdated, practices (specifically collective bargaining methods), resulting in a gigantic 
setback to the labor movement as unions struggled for survival during the business 
offensive.  Mizruchi (2013) describes this period of transition as a time where the 
corporate elite collectively mobilized around a specific cause (i.e. to defeat organized 
labor in the wake of the crisis, slump, and new regulations in the 1970s), achieved their 
goal, and then fractured into narrow, self-interested pursuits.  Some union decline may 
have resulted from the business offensive that emerged from political-economic 
transformations in the 1970s. 
Business Offensive Hypothesis: Union decline was produced by an accelerating business 
attack on labor in the 1970s, including both a resistance to new union formation and 
established bargaining practices. 
 
Explanation 4: Union Failure 
Throughout most of the postwar period, unions failed to organize at an adequate 
level to maintain vitality.  The labor movement in the United States, through its postwar 





on economic benefits and a general disregard for social issues outside of one’s bargaining 
sphere— became an amalgamation of unions that largely sought to protect and further 
their own gains rather than devote resources to pursue a broader working-class 
movement.  Business unionism seemed to work well for the labor movement, especially 
since union membership continued to expand.  In practice, this was often a mechanism 
for serving the short-term economic interests of a body of largely white, male unionists 
while excluding others.  However, workforce demographics changed over the second half 
of the twentieth century.  Two major demographic factors have negatively affected union 
strength, continuing to present a challenge to unions today: 1) the number of people in the 
workforce has grown dramatically since the end of World War II, presenting an 
organizing challenge for unionists, and 2) the composition of the workforce has become 
more feminized and less white, posing a challenge for many unions and workers who 
have sought to protect—or, more accurately, regain—their status in the labor aristocracy.  
This failure to embrace unionism as a working-class movement also harmed the labor 
movement in the postwar years. 
Union density is bound to shrink when the size of the workforce grows rapidly, 
unless new workers and firms are organized into unions (Clawson and Clawson 1999; 
Western 1997; Farber and Western 2001).  This is simple math.  Workforces that grow 
quickly do not usually grow as rapidly in established areas of the economy; rather, they 
grow in geographic or industrial areas that are new, innovative, or transformed places 
(Silver 2003; also see Piketty 2014, Ch.2 for a discussion on the effects of demographic 
growth on social change).  These areas of the economy are generally not the places where 





organizing in new industries.  As Clawson and Clawson (1999) emphasize, the hesitance 
of many established unions to include women and racial minorities despite the 
progressive social movements of the 1960s and 1970s as well as the resulting influx of 
these groups into the workforce, limited the ability of the labor movement to build 
democratic unions with capacity to organize in a changing economy.  Due to the fact that 
capital always gains a foothold in the workplace before organized labor—and since that 
creates a power differential from each workplace’s birth— unions faced an institutional 
challenge organizing in an expanding economy, especially given their aversion to women 
and minorities.  So, the failure of unions to effectively maintain organizing efforts may 
have contributed to organized labor’s decline (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Milkman 
1985). 
Union Organizing Hypothesis: The failure of unions to sufficiently organize new 
workplaces in the postwar era contributed to union decline. 
 
With the “male breadwinner” ideology regaining prominence after World War II 
and remaining throughout the 1950s—and to some extent, never completely fading—
many Americans believed men should be the primary household wage earners while 
women managed the domestic work (Coontz 2000).  Many of the women whose 
industrial fortitude of the 1940s inspired the creation of the Rosie the Riveter image 
suddenly found that their liberation was temporary as traditional social norms reemerged.  
The long-held cultural belief that women should tend families while men earned wages, 
or that women should work jobs that only compliment men’s wages, reduced the social 





women in society (Glenn 2002).  Even during the 1930s and 1940s, many unions kept 
women on the periphery of the labor movement (Lasky 1985) or excluded them entirely 
(Strom 1985).  The changing nature of unions in the 1950s, coupled with highly gender-
segregated workplaces, maintained gender inequalities within the labor movement.  As 
the occupational structure shifted from traditional union strongholds in manufacturing to 
the more feminized service sector, the material conditions of the new economy came into 
conflict with outdated cultural beliefs (Milkman 1985). 
 Some scholars have attributed women’s lower levels of union density to a 
disinterest in being organized, usually because of their shorter job tenures and proclivities 
for leaving the work force to have children (Bok and Dunlop 1970; Barkin 1961).  This 
view, although dated, overlooks the fact that workplaces have historically been shaped to 
reinforce gender distinctions (Smith-Doerr 2004; Salzinger 2003), due to the efforts of 
males working to protect their privileged economic status (Glenn 2002) and cultural 
meanings of gender (Brenner 1998).  However, women have actually demonstrated 
stronger inclinations to support unions in their own workplaces (Milkman 1985; Freeman 
and Medoff 1984) and have been closing the gap relative to men in total levels of 
unionization since entering the workforce en masse post-1970 (Milkman 2007).  
The norm in organizing efforts— even in organizing culture itself (Rooks 
2003)—has been for men (usually white) to dominate unions, although there have been 
efforts towards increasing gender equality.  Much of the old labor iconography features 
images glorifying masculine culture and the language is filled with metaphors related to 
war or dominance (for example, see Kornbluh 1988).  Even the joking relationships and 





desirability of masculine characteristics and the undesirability of feminine traits (for 
example, see Burawoy 1979; Halle 1984). Overall, the labor movement, similar to most 
male-dominated institutions, has not traditionally welcomed women. 
Female Exclusion Hypothesis: The growth of less gendered workplaces contributed to 
union decline. 
  
Many labor unions have also consciously excluded racial and ethnic minorities 
from their ranks and leadership positions.  Sometimes, such as in the case of the United 
Auto Workers, the national or international leadership may promote inclusivity while its 
locals work to maintain a racial hierarchy (Georgakas and Surkin 1975).  Williams 
(1987), in a 1976-1985 ethnographic study of black workers in suburban Chicago—
covering the time period in which union strength declined the most— found that even 
after deindustrialization, white flight, and urban decay, black workers at one of the only 
well-paying factories in town were regularly denied advancement opportunities afforded 
to white workers, disparaged by management, and alienated from their unions.  Royster 
(2003) illustrates how young black students graduating from technical high schools are 
often not mentored by teachers with the necessary network connections to land jobs in 
skilled-trade jobs—jobs that likely would be unionized. Whether unionized, or seeking 
stable working-class employment, racial minorities have historically been excluded from 
unionized jobs and participation in organized labor. 
 Trade unionism emerged in the 19th century as a movement dominated by white 
men (Fletcher and Gapasin 2008) and remained so as industrial unionism grew in the 





a few notable exceptions— contemporary unionism struggles with many of the same 
problems of inclusivity.  Fletcher and Gapasin (2008) stress the need for worker 
education in organizing efforts as a way to overcome this challenge to building a stronger 
labor movement.  As the United Farmworkers illustrated in the 1960s (Ganz 2009; Shaw 
2010), the Justice for Janitors campaign of the early 1990s (Milkman 2006; Waldinger et 
al. 1998), and more recent campaigns have displayed, organizing around social-justice, 
movement-oriented unionism is definitely possible. 
Racial Exclusion Hypothesis: The growth in racially diverse workplaces contributed to 
union decline. 
 
Explanation 5: Financialization 
In addition to the reorganization of productive capital, the rise of finance capital 
has transformed the U.S. economy as well.  A process of financialization began with 
several deregulatory measures in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which played a pivotal 
role in weakening the strength of the labor movement.  National policy came to privilege 
the liquidity of capital over production and employment stability as deregulation 
proceeded, leading many non-finance firms to progressively prefer investments in 
financial services over production (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013), causing an 
institutional reorganization which transferred power to finance-oriented capitalists.  
Financial markets created new financial mechanisms, such as derivatives, that acted in 
accordance with developing market logics (MacKenzie and Millo 2003).  Institutional 
analysis has revealed that debt holding became a highly profitable endeavor as interest 





firms following the Supreme Court’s Marquette decision in 1978 (Hyman 2012; also see 
Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011).  A removal of the restrictions on bank mergers 
following the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 
allowed for a consolidation of the banking industry (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011) 
shifting economic power into the hands of large corporate banks and away from the rest 
of the economy. In the process, the finance industry vastly expanded its influence over 
the economy through the expansion of credit and asset management (Greenwood and 
Scharfstein 2013).  Financialization is marked by the increasing reliance on finance by 
non-finance firms as well as the predominance of banks over the non-finance economy 
(Epstein and Jayadev 2005; Krippner 2005).  The combined effects of financialization, as 
investments in finance capital have encroached on productive investments, has been 
associated with an overall decline in production in the U.S. economy (Stockhammer 
2004; Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2015). 
 Financialization has been deeply tied to the shareholder value movement, which 
holds the benefit of stock owners as the primary concern of a company (Fligstein and 
Shin 2007).  This ended the “managerial revolution” described by economic historian 
Alfred Chandler (1977), reconfiguring the dominant logic of U.S. capitalism from 
production-oriented to finance-oriented.  As Fligstein and Shin (2007) note, the 
shareholder value movement was fundamentally at odds with organized labor, viewing 
unions as costly inefficiencies from which profits could be freed.  Since finance became 
more profitable than production over the short run, one of the ways shareholders may 





production (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013), thereby gaining the ability to circumvent 
unions in times of labor unrest. 
Financialization has been shown to negatively impact labor in other ways as well.  
Lin (2013) finds that financialization is associated with declines in employment.  Davis 
(2014) finds that financialization has occurred at the expense of investment in production, 
which explains why employment would decline as a result.  Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 
(2013) speculate that productive labor has been devalued in the process (see Hanley 2014 
for an example of this).  However, some of what appears as financial investments in the 
balance sheets of U.S. companies may simply be global investments in international 
subsidiaries (Krippner 2011; Baud and Durand 2012), which also could undermine 
organized labor via direct externalization of production. 
Financialization Hypothesis: Both the increasing predominance of the finance industry 
and the financialization of non-finance firms will negatively impact labor unions. 
 
 While financialization has had a notably negative impact on the U.S. economy, 
scholars have not yet linked the process with union decline.  Van Arnum and Naples 
(2013) speculate that financialization may indirectly lead to de-unionization.  To the best 
of my knowledge, scholars have yet to test the effect of financialization on union 







I have offered five primary explanations for union decline.  Within the arguments 
for each lie hypotheses that parse different components or aspects of the explanations.  
These hypotheses must now be operationalized into variables that can explain the 
strength of each explanation at different moments in time.  All explanations seem 
plausible, but the task is now to parse their temporal effects apart.  To do so, hypotheses 
are examined using industry-level panel data for the years 1970-2008.   
Variables have been collected from a variety of sources.  The Current Population 
Survey (CPS) and its CPS Integrated Public Use Micro-Series (IPUMS) are each sources 
for demographic, geographic, and aggregated workplace data.  The Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) provides National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data, which 
includes information on industry earnings, investments, and assets.  The Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) Corporation Complete Reports provides my financialization measure.    
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) provides detailed information on the 
outcomes of union certification elections and unfair labor practice (ULP) claims.  The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Structural Analysis 
(STAN) database provides a measure for global competition. Details on data sources can 







Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Suitable firm level employment data do not exist for the United States.  Therefore, 
an industry-level analysis is used as a proxy for the sites where production occurs (see 
Kristal 2013; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013).  Industries included in the data 
include all goods and services in the private, non-finance economy. In total, 44 industries 
are in the dataset.  Twenty-two industries span the entire time period.  Ten industries are 
only included for years 1970-1997.  Twelve industries are only included for years 1998-
2008.  See Appendix B for a detailed description of industries. 
One of the issues confronted by researchers using industry-level time-series data 
stems from the classification of industries in national data records.  Data for the period 
1970-1997 uses the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, but data for all years 
1998 and after use the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS).  For 
researchers, the problem with this switch is that industrial classifications became 
reconfigured due to structural changes in the economy, meaning that many firms changed 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Union Members (Ln) 1270 11.960 1.192 8.349 14.278
Capital Flight (%) 1270 0.357 0.120 0.053 0.826
Computerization (%) 1270 0.125 0.127 0.000 0.682
Global Competition (%) 768 0.155 0.144 0.000 0.838
ULPs (negative ratio) 1270 -0.374 0.114 -0.586 -0.178
NLRB Union Loss % 1270 0.514 0.046 0.400 0.597
Organizing Efforts (negative ratio) 1270 -0.091 0.060 -0.199 -0.021
% College Educated 1270 0.198 0.127 0.000 0.725
% Some College 1270 0.211 0.074 0.016 0.429
% Non-white Workers 1270 0.227 0.106 0.001 0.687
% Female Workers 1270 0.325 0.184 0.000 0.822
FIRE (%) 1270 0.177 0.019 0.147 0.205
Productive Firm Financialization (%) 1270 0.197 0.100 0.034 0.828





their industry groupings while some industries became aggregated or disaggregated.  To 
create a sense of continuity, industry groupings that remain mostly unchanged in the 
1970-2008 period are combined to bridge the SIC-NAICS divide.  Industry classifications 
that do not appear in NAICS simply disappear from the data with the end of SIC in 
1997.7    
 Declining union power is measured using the dependent variable union members.  
It is a CPS measure of the natural log of total union employees per industry.  Successes 
and failures of unions at individual firms cannot be analyzed with this data.  However, 
within-industry unionization presented here demonstrates important structural level 
trends in the U.S. economy.  I chose union membership, rather than the conventional 
union density.  The reason for this choice lies in my conceptualization of power, which 
relies on total organizational mobilization capacity rather than relative proportions.  As 
noted by nearly all previous scholars, there is a gradual decline across the period with a 
steep drop-off in the early 1980s.   
The Labor Policy explanation includes policy drift.  Policy drift is tested using a 
simple year measure. 
The Reconfiguration of Productive Capital explanation is gauged by observing 
data on global competition, levels of automation, and worker education levels.  The 
Capital Flight hypothesis is tested using Domestic Capital Flight, a measure of the spatial 
relocation of work away from unionized areas and into developing areas of the economy.  
Domestic Capital flight is an IPUMS measure of the percentage of U.S. workers within 
                                                 
7 This approach is somewhat conservative, as it only combines industries that can be directly replicated 





each industry employed in Right-to-Work states.8 The global competition hypothesis is 
tested using global competition, an OECD-STAN measure of import penetration9 in 
extractive and transformative industries.  Accounting for the technological change 
hypothesis, I measure automation, which is a BEA-NIPA measure of computer 
investment as a proportion of total investment in fixed assets.  The college education 
hypothesis is tested using college, an IPUMS measure of the percentage of workers in an 
industry who have completed a bachelor’s degree.     
The Business Offensive explanation uses National Labor Relations Board data on 
national-level conflict between labor and capital.  Both public- and private-sector 
information is included, due to limitations in data collection capabilities.  However, the 
inclusion of data for the entire economy can serve as an indicator of the strength and the 
organizing efforts of the labor movement.  Union losses measures the proportion of union 
certification elections lost by unions in relation the total number of elections held.  This is 
partially an indicator of the increased usage of anti-union tactics on the part of employers, 
as the presence of these tactics has effectively lowered the chances that unions secure 
election victory (Bronfenbrenner 2009).  ULPs is a measure of unfair labor practice 
claims made by workers at specific workplaces, with a negative coefficient to indicate 
employer resistance rather than union success.  Although there are many tactical reasons 
for organized workers to file or abstain from filing ULP claims which can influence 
                                                 
8 For each respondent in IPUMS, the worker’s state is coded as either a RTW state or a non-RTW state.  
CPS clustered several states into regions in years 1970-76, so fuzzy set coding was used to derive the 
percentage of workers in RTW states.  Fuzzy set estimates were obtained using Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) Current Employment Statistics state employment estimates for total employment by state.  The data 
can be found at http://www.bls.gov/sae/#tables. 
9 Import penetration is a measure of foreign goods in an industry as a share of the gross domestic product 





results as strategies shift, the total number of claims filed is an indicator of the intensity 
of managerial opposition to unionism.   
The union organizing hypothesis is tested using organizing efforts, a measurement 
of the natural log total NLRB union certification elections per thousand employees, with 
values flipped to negative to better capture organizing failure rather than the positive 
benefits of organizing.  This serves as an indicator of the effect of labor’s collective 
failure to effectively organize as unions went into crisis.  The racial exclusion hypothesis 
is tested with non-white workers as a percentage of workers in an industry. The female 
exclusion hypothesis is tested using female workers, an IPUMS measure of the 
percentage of women in each industry.   
The financialization hypothesis operates at both national and industry levels. 
FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) is a national-level BEA-NIPA measure of the 
percentage of the U.S. gross domestic product attributable to the financial sector, which is 
conceptualized as an indicator of the growing power of the financial sector.  Productive 
firm financialization is an industry-level measure using IRS Corporate Complete Report 
data of corporate financial assets as a proportion of total assets in private, non-finance 
industries.  This is conceptualized to capture a shift in firm investment strategy away 








 The analysis contains two stages.  First, long-term effects of each factor on the 
entire economy are examined, providing the net effects of union decline.  Second, 
locally-weighted regressions are used to estimate the dynamic effects of each variable as 
their coefficients weaken or strengthen over time. This trend is weighted exponentially by 
a factor of 0.810 for each year of distance from the current year so that the effects of any 
particular year diminish across each subsequent year, allowing trends to be plotted for 
specific points in time when the effects of each variable change.  As a new approach for 
determining temporal causality, my usage of locally-weighted regressions is a powerful 
tool for parsing complex social processes by paying more attention to when a causal 
impact happens than simply to statistical significance across the entire period.   
My main models address the various explanations of union decline with 
temporally-weighted single-equation error correction models (ECMs, see Beck 1991; De 
Boef and Keele 2008). The analytical advantage of ECMs is that they allow researchers 
to estimate the long-run, cumulative effect of the explanatory variable. I use temporal 
weighting to identify particular moments in time where effects are stronger and weaker.  
To absorb the interferences of industrial trends, fixed effect terms are included for 
industry in the models.11 This ensures that the estimates are derived from within industry 
                                                 
10 When using locally-weighted regressions, a researcher must choose a factor that best fits their analysis.  
A factor of 1 would yield the same results for each year.  Numbers closer to one are better at measuring 
long-term stability, while numbers closer to 0 are better at measuring shocks.  After some testing, a factor 
of 0.8 was chosen as a compromise between the two.  The calculations used in these models are more 
conservative than the cumulative effects in APPENDIX C so the results are not directly comparable.  For 
this analysis, locally-weighted regressions are useful for disaggregating the time and sector-specific effects. 
11 The main interest of this study is to analyze the net effects of specific processes on the broader structure 





variance in the rate of change instead of unobserved between-industry differences. 
Standard errors are clustered by industry.  
The models are specified as: 
∆Yi,t = α0 + α1,i −β1Yi,t−1 + β2Xi,t−1  + β3∆Xi,t + εi,t   
where ΔYt denotes the first difference Yt - Yt-1, α0 denotes the grand mean, α1,i denotes 
industry-specific deviation in change, β1 denotes the adjustment or error correction rate of 
Y, and β2 denotes that the direct effect of Xt-1 on ΔYt. β3∆Xi,t is treated as a control for 
short run investment allocations. Conditional on other covariates, a unit increase in Yt-1 
leads to β1 unit decrease in ΔYt and therefore 1- β1 unit increase in Yt. Furthermore, 
because the dataset is unbalanced (the NAICS data has more industrial categories), the 
importance across years is equalized by assigning a year-specific inverse probability 
weight to each observation: 
𝑊𝑖,𝑡 = 1 𝑁𝑡⁄  
where W denotes the weight of observation i, and N denotes the total employment in year 
t. 
The first year every industry appears in the data drops from the equation due to 
the lag structure of the ECMs.  This occurs in either 1970 or 1998, depending on the 
SIC/NAICS code.  For this reason, the number of observations in the output does not 
match those of the descriptive statistics in Table 1. 
ECM models estimate both an instantaneous and long run effect for all covariates. 





analysis. Interpreting the contemporaneous coefficient as an instantaneous effect is only 
appropriate when the causal direction is firmly established and might be less appropriate 
in a longer time series as temporal dynamics begin to emerge. The interpretation of the 
long-run effect, by contrast, does not require an implausible causal assumption and is 
consistent with the theoretical argument that long-term union decline has fundamentally 
altered capital-labor relations. To compute the long-run effect, β2 is divided by the error 
correction rate β1. 
 Three of the five national-level trend variables cannot be entered into the same 
model due to multi-collinearity.12  For this reason, my analysis uses four parallel 
explanatory models, each with different national-level independent variables.  All 
industry-level variables remain the same in each model.  Model 1, the “FIRE” model, 
examines the effects of the increasing predominance of FIRE in the U.S. economy.  
Model 2, the “Union Failure” model, tests whether or not decreasing union organizing 
efforts caused union decline.  Model 3, the “Year” model, includes a control for year to 
estimate the extent to which effects captured through the simple progression of time, such 
as legislative policy drift, caused union decline.  Together, these models will collectively 
test whether the Reagan presidential administration played a unique role in creating a 
crisis for organized labor (Tope and Jacobs 2009).  While some national trends are not 
statistically tested in the same models, a side-by-side comparison of trends can highlight 
similarities and differences in each of these three models. 
  
                                                 






Results are organized by the five union decline explanations.  Each is displayed 
below by model.  Results are somewhat similar across the three national time trend 
models.  See differences in the measured effects of FIRE, Union Failure to Organize, and 
Year variables to interpret any differences between models.  Subsequent figures combine 
models by variable.  Figures can be interpreted by viewing the trend each year in relation 
to zero.  Anytime the confidence intervals for each coefficient do not overlap the y-axis 
of the graph, the effect for that particular year is significant.  Only long-term effects for 
specific years are captured in this type of analysis.  The profound strength of the 
temporal-weighted analysis is the ability to untangle the temporal dynamics of historical 
processes.  Most time series analyses treat causal effects as if they are constant over time. 
This is almost always an unrealistic assumption. In the literature on union decline 
reviewed above there is a strong historical argument not only about what, but also when 
factors began to influence union decline. Aggregated long-term effects for the entire 
period are included in Appendix C.   
 First, I examine the labor policy in Explanation 1.  Effects captured in the Year 
variable, presented in Figure 2, are consistently negative throughout the entire time 
period.  This is important for several reasons.  The year effect captures aspects of policy 
drift that are not modeled elsewhere.  Although FIRE, Union Organizing, and the 
political mobilization of capitalists may be captured in this effect, this outcome 
nonetheless lends credence to the Policy Drift Hypothesis, which already receives 
qualitative support.  Given that effects are present and strongest in the 1970s, evidence 





1980s were not as uniquely influential to union decline as has previously been suggested 
(Tope and Jacobs 2009).   
Figure 2: Year-Specific  Effects on Union Membership 
 
Explanation 2, on the reconfiguration of productive capital, examines structural 
changes to the political economic and industrial structures. Contrary to the Capital Flight 
Hypothesis, the increase in employment in Right-to-Work states was not a primary driver 
of union decline (see Figure 3).  The shifting patterns of employment away from states 
with stronger labor laws actually boosted union membership as unions declined in the 
early 1980s.  This is consistent with Western’s (1997) argument that changes to the 
industrial structure merely shifted union strength.  However, RTW laws probably still 
have a suppressant effect on the capacity of workers to exercise power. 
Figure 3: Effects of Domestic Capital Flight on Union Membership 
 
 This counterintuitive result requires more explanation.  Upon further inspection 





effect on union membership in the E&T sector.  That is, the positive result for capital 
flight can only be explained by the expansion of employment in the service sector.  The 
effects of capital flight to states with weak labor laws, then, must consider the sectoral 
transformation in U.S. employment.  As employment in the extractive and transformative 
sector declined, the growth of the service sector provided new opportunities for 
unionization, even if conditions were not conducive to a thriving labor movement.  At the 
same time, jobs in goods-producing industries were likely to be completely eliminated 
through offshoring or remain non-unionized after outsourcing. 
 Increased global competition has consistently reduced union membership in the 
E&T sector (see Figure 4).  Important to note here is that the Global Competition 
measure only contains goods-producing industries, so graphs in this figure are not tested 
in the same analysis as other figures displayed.  If global competition were to be factored 
into the rest of the results section, observations from the service sector would be 
eliminated from the analysis.  Therefore, I have chosen to exclude results from the other 
variables included in the models with Global Competition.  
 






The effect of global competition actually became stronger over time, even as there 
is less union membership to be lost.  Consistent with Beverly Silver’s (2003) argument, 
capital seems to flee union dense geographic locations to less unionized locales whenever 
possible.  This means that some types of work have been directly transported out of the 
United States, becoming direct competition for American workers.  Simultaneously, and 
perhaps equally important, other countries became more economically competitive with 
the United States throughout the postwar years, a process that still continues.  While 
difficult to trace, part of this increased competition might be the result of the 
financialization of investment portfolios of U.S. firms as they invest in foreign 
subsidiaries (Krippner 2011; Baud and Durand 2012).  The Global Competition 
Hypothesis is supported. 
The automation of the U.S. economy is presented in Figure 5.  As displayed, 
results reveal that the effects of automation are not stationary.  Investment in computer 
technology positively affected union membership until the mid-1990s.  At this point, 
increased computer investment became a driver for union decline for the remainder of the 
time studied. 






Automation may have originally represented an increase in fixed assets, which 
represented an investment in production in a particular locality.  In later years, negative 
effects may have been caused by further advancements in computer technology and the 
growth of employment in the less capital-intensive service sector.  Inter-industry 
variation of these effects likely exists, especially since some jobs may be supplemented 
and other jobs replaced by computer technology (Autor 2003; Kristal 2013). 
 For most years, union decline is not significantly related to the growth of college 
educated labor forces. However, an increasingly college-educated workforce negatively 
impacted unions beginning in the early- to mid-1980s into the mid-1990s and after 2003 
(see Figure 6).  That is, increases in college-educated workers were subsequently 
followed by loss of union membership net of other factors.  Mosher (2007) finds that 
union decline precipitated growth in the college premium on workers’ wages in the 
1980s.  This analysis reveals that, when any effect existed, an increase in college-
educated workers preceded shrinking union membership.  That is, rising college premium 
might have driven union decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Figure 6: Effects of College Education on Union Membership 
 
Explanation 3 includes the business offensive, which analyzes the behavior of 





in time, most notably in the time period before 1980 (Figure 7).  Employers increasingly 
embraced illegal tactics throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Bronfenbrenner 2009; Freeman 
and Medoff 1984), so the negative effects of ULPs on membership before declines in the 
1980s are not surprising.  This does provide further empirical evidence that the business 
community was not emboldened or enabled by the Reagan administration, which did not 
take office until 1981.  Worth mentioning here is that ULPs are initiated strategically by 
unions, so the initial impact of the business offensive might best be captured here. 
Figure 7: Effects of Unfair Labor Practices on Union Membership 
 
 Union losses in NLRB elections only seem to have driven union decline in the 
late 1980s (Figure 8).  However, the negative effect is not present when union organizing 
efforts are taken into account.  This may happen because the lack of union organizing 
was more impactful than anti-union campaigns organized by management.  Prior research 
has already indicated that unions are more likely to win when they devote more resources 
to organizing (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998), so one may plausibly conclude that 
labor unions misallocated their resources by becoming more defensive in their efforts.  In 
models measuring long-term effects for the entire period (Appendix C), rather than these 






Figure 8: Effects of Union Losses in NLRB Elections on Union Membership 
 
 Given the results of ULPs and union losses, the Business Offensive Hypothesis is 
supported.  Figures for these two variables indicate that the effect of illegal employer 
tactics was already harming unions in the 1970s, before employers developed more 
sophisticated techniques for fighting unionization. 
 Union Failure is captured in Explanation 4, including the lack of organizing 
efforts and labor movement exclusion.  Union Failure to Organize consistently led to 
declines in union membership in every year of the analysis, supporting the Union 
Organizing Hypothesis (Figure 9).  Consistent with the findings of Bronfenbrenner and 
Juravich (1998), unions must organize if they are to win.  Whether or not this has always 
been possible is debatable.  The inadequacy of union organizing efforts may have 
stemmed from the purging of labor radicalism in the 1950s, the inability to predict the 
business offensive during an economic boom period, or possibly the organizational 
inertia caused by the bureaucratization of the labor movement. However, as some of the 
short-term survival techniques that unions used as the business offensive began were not 






Figure 9: Effects of Union Failure to Organize on Union Membership 
 
Women may have been historically excluded from many aspects of labor 
movement participation, but this analysis illustrates that this exclusion did not contribute 
to decline in the post-1970 era (See Figure 10).  By some time in the 1980s or 1990s, the 
net effect of an increasingly female workforce was positive for labor unions.  This effect 
became increasingly stronger throughout the 2000s.  As old practices of female exclusion 
slowly yielded to new economic conditions (Milkman 1985; 2007), increasing labor 
movement access to feminized industries has buffered the unions from further decline.  
While sex-based exclusion is still likely a factor in the labor movement, I find no 
evidence supporting the Female Exclusion Hypothesis. 
Figure 10: Effects of Feminization of the Workforce on Union Membership 
 
Racial exclusion had no measurable effect on union decline in locally-weighted 





labor movement (Fletcher and Gapasin 2008), effects did not cause union decline at any 
particular time in this analysis. 
Figure 11: Effects of Racial Diversification of the Workforce on Union Membership 
 
 Explantion 5 considers the financialization of the U.S. economy.  Financialization 
has resulted in lower union membership.  The first component of the financialization 
hypothesis, illustrated in the Figure 12, presents the negative effects of an increasingly 
predominant finance sector on union membership, which persist throughout the entire 
period studied.  As the FIRE sector grew as a proportion of U.S. gross domestic product, 
its ability to extract rents increased (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011) through expanded 
financial investments in the productive economy.  Tomaskovic-Devey, Lin, and Meyers 
(2015) find that financialization increased interest paid to creditors, indicating that 
economic rents from the productive economy might be paid to FIRE.  With this type of 
leverage, and knowing that bankers have played pivotal roles in anti-union business 
groups such as the Business Roundtable (Mizruchi 2013), the connection between a 
growing financial sector and union decline seems more intuitive.  The rise of the 
shareholder value movement (Fligstein and Shin 2007, coupled with FIRE’s unique 
power over the economy, explain negative impact of FIRE on union membership. The 
effects of a financializing economy were strongest earlier in the period, although they are 





Figure 12: Effects of the Growth of FIRE (Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate) on 
Union Membership 
 
 In contrast, the financialization of productive firms began to drive union decline 
only after 1980 (Figure 13).  After financial deregulations relaxed restrictions on credit in 
1978 and enabled banking industry mergers in 1980, firms gained the ability to generate 
income through investments in finance rather than production.  With labor marginalized 
in the revenue generation process (Lin 2013), unions lost a strategic point of leverage in 
the bargaining process as their ability to threaten company revenue sources diminished.  
A financialized company can more easily outlast workers engaging in a traditional strike, 
which is why increased worker militancy (Aronowitz 2014) is not sufficient for unions 
contesting capital in the new economy.  A deep recession in 1981-1982 could have 
served as a catalyst for firms to invest in finance instead of production, especially as high 






Figure 13: Effects of the Financialization of Productive Firms on Union 
Membership 
 
 These results indicate that an adequate explanation of union decline should 
include explanations of: 1) labor policy and the effects of policy drift, 2) the 
reconfiguration of productive capital through a series of political-economic processes, 3) 
the political mobilization and offensive of the business community, and 4) the failure of 
the labor movement to adequately respond to a changing environment.  As a new force 
driving union decline in the 1980s, the financialization of the U.S. economy may be 
included in the second point.  Conventional explanations pointing to racism and sexism in 
the labor movement, capital flight to RTW states, and the importance of the Reagan 
administration are not supported by this analysis. In the case of race, sex, college, and 
RTW, the more fundamental problem was failure to organize. Only in the case of college 
educated workers is there evidence of union avoidance linked to the failure to organize 
during a major reconfiguration of the industrial structure. The main lesson to be drawn 
from this analysis is that labor lost power relative to capital due to a series of 
interdependent political and economic processes developing both within organizations 







Contrary to some recent research (Tope and Jacobs 2009; Jacobs and Myers 
2014), this paper finds that Ronald Reagan was not the primary driver of union collapse 
in the 1980s.  Instead, many forces led to the collapse of the labor movement as a 
powerful social actor.  Union decline is a complex social issue that has occurred beyond 
the scope of one explanation or any one presidential administration.  Although the 
Reagan administration’s NLRB might have been particularly hostile to labor, I have 
shown that other social processes played a more influential role and began at earlier 
moments in time.  Individuals are the product of their historical moment; likewise, 
Reagan’s election in 1980 can be viewed, in large part, as a product of the success of the 
political mobilization of business in the 1970s13.  The business community had 
effectively elected a pro-business candidate in their anti-union efforts, but the direct 
mobilization against union organizing drives, capital investments away from domestic 
production and toward finance, and global production, as well as the competitive 
pressures of globalization were more fundamental. 
U.S. union decline has been the product of shifts in the relational power between 
capital and labor.  Changes in the political economic structure afforded capitalists the 
opportunity to reclaim power that they had lost since the pre-NLRA era.  Simultaneously, 
labor unions mostly failed to stake claims on the production process itself, leaving unions 
narrowly focused on wages and sapped of the energy gained during the early days of the 
Wagner Act.  Meanwhile, U.S. labor policy changed very little in the years preceding 
                                                 
13 Unfortunately, I was not able to test the effects of the political mobilization of business in this paper.  
Deeper analysis of corporate lobbying, campaign donations, and the organization of corporate interest 





organized labor’s crisis in the 1980s.  Employers exploited the chance to take advantage 
of this new era.  The culmination of all these processes has driven union decline. 
A chain of shocks fundamentally transformed the collective bargaining landscape 
in the l970s and 1980s.  Private-sector union density had already been shrinking by the 
1970s, but the rapid spread of global capitalism and a sharp oil crisis gave the business 
community an incentive to mobilize.  Coming on the heels of racial and gender political 
turmoil, the business community exploited the opportunity to use the political backlash 
against leftism to change institutional politics.  They used their resources to transform 
public policy by leading the drive to deregulate both financial and productive constraints, 
jolting the bargaining process out of its routinized patterns.  Almost four decades later, 
organized labor has yet to recover. 
Many causes have led to the decline of the American labor movement.  When 
multiple causes are examined directly and with the use of locally weighted regressions, as 
in this paper, temporal dynamics become much clearer, revealing that certain factors are 
more or less prominent at certain points in time.  For example, the expansion of the U.S. 
workforce has led to declines in union density since the 1950s.  Declines in total union 
membership, however, did not occur until union jobs were destroyed in the late 1970s 
and were replaced by jobs in non-unionized industries and regions.   
Accelerated union decline was first the result of the restructuring of the United 
States domestic economy in the 1970s and 1980s.  Commonly termed deindustrialization, 
capital flight from unionized to non-unionized geographic areas caused layoffs in many 





and labor laws were much weaker.  Manufacturing jobs left the country on a massive 
scale, usually replaced with service-sector work.  Computer technology eventually began 
to eliminate union membership by the early-2000s, but this phenomenon most likely 
varied significantly by industry.  As good-paying union jobs became less available, 
college education became increasingly necessary to obtain middle-class incomes, perhaps 
leading many to seek improved life chances through individual means rather than 
collective action.  Together, these components of deindustrialization have smashed many 
strongholds of industrial unionism, where the labor movement was strongest. 
Much of the decline was made possible as policy drift, the delayed effects of the 
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, became more prominent in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
While Taft-Hartley had limited labor tactics and sapped union vitality as part of its 
design, the slow drag of the early postwar era became a resurgent force in these later 
decades, in many ways preventing unions from defending themselves when employer 
behaviors changed.  First, unions had lost rank-and-file vitality as leftists were purged 
from their organizations, leaving many unprepared for the coming business offensive.  
Second, Right-to-Work laws, born of Taft-Hartley, probably mired union organizing.  
Third, so long as other structural barriers kept the capital-labor accord in place, unions 
did not have to worry as much about restrictions on secondary boycotts, wildcat strikes, 
or court injunctions on strike activity.  Though organized labor’s hands were 
metaphorically tied in 1947, they did fine at the outset. In fact, absolute union 
membership continued to grow until 1980. Union bargaining with capital was akin to 





unions suddenly could no longer play the game effectively.  In this manner, national labor 
law became a hindrance on union activity. 
Reacting to changes in the economy and political system, partially of their own 
creation, the business community sought to return to the favorable economic conditions 
of the early postwar era.  Since capitalists could directly respond to increasing global 
competition, they targeted the domestic economy – mobilizing against union power (and 
state regulation) to mitigate growing uncertainty.  Attempting to reclaim managerial 
prerogative, a twofold attack on labor unions was initiated.  First, business interests 
organized to change national economic policy in efforts to reclaim economic surpluses 
and workplace control from workers.  Second, employers took advantage of economic 
changes, oftentimes refusing to negotiate with unions, demanding concessions, and 
devoting resources to union prevention tactics.  Coupled together, employers took 
advantage of favorable economic developments, institutionalizing their agenda within 
governmental policy as economic uncertainty swept the country.  Organized labor’s base 
of power was effectively swept away as employers reasserted dominance in the 
workplace.  Many union jobs were eliminated as the union strategies of the past failed to 
address the new bargaining climate. 
Failure to adequately organize was a major part of the failure of unions.  Labor is 
more likely to win when more union resources are devoted to organizing (Bronfenbrenner 
and Juravich 1998).  However, wages and absolute union membership rose consistently 
until the 1970s.  Many labor unions lost sight of the need to constantly maintain union 
vitality by supporting the causes of workers everywhere.  Clinging to the gains of the 





self-preservation in the new economy.  Many efforts towards labor movement reform 
were too little and may have happened too late. 
Evidence in this paper reveals for the first time that the financialization of the 
economy may have been partly responsible for labor’s sudden crisis of the 1980s.  
Growing influence from both the finance sector and firm-level financial investments 
consistently depressed union membership levels.  Financial deregulation in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s made these two processes drivers of union decline.  With increasing 
pressures to maximize shareholder value and efforts to reduce uncertainty, firms used 
financial mechanisms to undercut the bargaining power of labor unions.   Financial sector 
growth continued to steadily suppress union growth through 2008.  Likely a product of 
the shareholder value movement (Fligstein and Shin 2007), the increased reliance of 
productive firms on financial investments in the 1980s may have been the primary factor 
in ending organized labor’s reign as an influential advocate of working-class interests.  
Reducing uncertainty, financial investments could have been used as a conscious anti-
union tactic by buffering employers from the threat of labor militancy. 
Other recent research has linked the automation of the economy to union decline 
(Kristal 2013).  While this seems to be the case since the mid-1990s, computer 
investment is actually associated with higher levels of union membership in previous 
decades in my analyses.  Some variation most likely exists by industry, but the net effects 
in the extractive and transformative sector are highly positive across the entire period. 
While computer investments undoubtedly reduced the need for some kinds of labor, other 





production. Unlike divesting from unionized areas or investing in financial speculation, 
computer investment is investment in production. 
Aside from the substantive findings described above, I advance relational 
inequality theory and other theories of organizational power by highlighting the complex 
interplay of temporal dynamics on social processes.  As I have demonstrated, the success 
or failure of competing groups at one point in time rests on the ability of actors to 
capitalize on institutional configurations of multiple social processes in previous time 
periods.  Although the very nature of capitalism lends capital an advantage over labor, the 
ability of organized labor to wrest organizational resources from capitalists, or vice versa, 
lies in these groups’ abilities to effectively assess and utilize themselves, each other, the 
state, and political economic arrangements.  Like a chess match, the power of a player in 
one particular turn may not determine who wins the game, but it sure helps. 
Accepting the overwhelming evidence of the benefits that unions provide to the 
economy, civic political participation, and the workplace, I will conclude by prescriptions 
for the recovery of the labor movement: 
Build stronger union protections into labor policy.  Policymakers must equal the 
playing field by ensuring workers’ ability to unionize without minimal employer 
interference, relaxing restrictions that prevent some workers from unionizing, and 
rescinding Taft-Hartley limitations on labor tactics.  To ensure continued union strength, 
labor would benefit from a higher degree of institutionalization within the government 





Labor must use tactics that work in a modern economy.  Union decline happened 
partly because old practices were no longer effective.  Striking and militancy can be 
useful, but can also cost workers their jobs if an employer is persuaded to move 
production or financialize their investments.  With this in mind, labor activists must 
strategically analyze their own vulnerabilities and points of leverage to overcome 
employer opposition (Juravich 2007). 
Labor must expand organizing efforts.  This is easier said than done, but a mass 
mobilization is necessary if the labor movement is to regain its status as a powerful voice 
for the working class.  To accomplish this, labor leaders must continue organizing 
workers in new industries and occupations.  Beyond this, unions must continue building a 
more inclusive labor movement, driven by the needs of workers on the shop floor. 
None of these recommendations will be easy, as employer interests are 
structurally at odds with labor unions, but each serves a necessary role in rebuilding the 
power of the U.S. labor movement. 
Looking to the future, unionism in the U.S. will continue to struggle.  During the 
1980s, unions lost much of their ability to influence representative politics, set prevailing 
wages, mitigate inequality, and a host of other effects as membership plummeted.  This 
means that unions must now successfully navigate through an environment where labor 
policies are weakened, with employers less affected by traditional union tactics and better 
equipped to resist union demands.  For unions to succeed and for workers to enjoy their 
right to unionize, organized labor must find strategic points at which capital flows can be 





corporate images, the perishability of products, types of links in supply chains, the 
liquidity of production processes, types of transportation materials, the geographic 
specificity of production, etc.  Unions have a long struggle ahead, so better understanding 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX B  
INDUSTRY MATCHING USED IN ANALYSIS 
 
Standard Industrial Classification, 1970-1997 
North American Industry Classification 
System, 1998-2008 
  Mining 
Metal mining   
Coal mining   
Oil and gas extraction   
Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels   
Electric, gas, and sanitary services Utilities 
Construction Construction 
Food and kindred products Food, Beverage, and Tobacco manufacturing 
Tobacco manufactures   
Apparel and other textile products Apparel, Leather, and other textile products 
Leather and leather products   





Paper and allied products Paper and allied products 
Printing and publishing Printing and publishing 
Chemicals and allied products Chemicals and allied products 
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 
Petroleum(including integrated) and coal 
products 
Petroleum(including integrated) and coal 
products 
Primary metal industries Primary metal industries 
Furniture and fixtures Furniture & related product 
Textile mill products Textile mill products 
Primary metal industries Primary metal industries 
Fabricated metal products Fabricated metal products 
Machinery, except electrical Machinery, except electrical 
Electrical and electronic equipment Electrical equipment, appliance, and 
component manufacturing 
Transportation equipment, except motor 
vehicles 
Transportation equipment 
Motor vehicles and equipment   





  Computer and electronic product 
manufacturing 
  Nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing 
Instruments and related products   
Wholesale (Total) Wholesale (Total) 
Retail(Total) Retail (Total) 
Transportation Air, rail, and water transportation 
  Truck transportation 
  Transit and ground passenger transportation 
  Pipeline transportation 
  Other transportation & support activities 
  warehousing and storage 
Communication   
  Broadcasting and telecommunications 
  Information services and data processing 
services 





Business services   
Personal services   
Auto repair, miscellaneous repair services   
  Professional, scientific, and technical services 
  Administrative and support services 
  Waste management & remediation services 
  Health care and social assistance (Total) 
Amusement and recreation services Amusement, gambling, and recreation 
industries 
  Other arts, entertainment, and recreation 
Hotels and other lodging places Accommodation 
  Food services and drinking places 
 
As displayed in the table for Appendix A, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
coding for years 1970-1997 were combined with coding from North American Industrial 
Classification System (NAICS), years 1998-2008.  Since industrial categories are not 
entirely congruent across the two classification systems, the combination strategy 
involved matching or combining industries when easily accomplished, and leaving 





changed or became more detailed.  The table is shaded to indicate which industries 
match, are components of each other, or are unique to each classification system across 
the two periods.  In the data, this produced the effect of some industries spanning the 





























ULPs -0.355*** -0.254** -0.797***
(0.083) (0.089) (0.086)
Union Losses -0.694** 0.597* -2.286***
(0.265) (0.281) (0.353)
Productive-Firm Financialization -1.631*** -1.842*** -1.945***
(0.129) (0.104) (0.127)
Domestic Capital Fl ight 2.013*** 2.248*** 2.167***
(0.332) (0.355) (0.400)
Automation (%) 0.712*** 0.534*** 0.562***
(0.128) (0.122) (0.140)
College Educated (%) -1.445*** -1.159*** -1.326***
(0.230) (0.226) (0.263)
Female Workers (%) 1.928*** 2.224*** 1.552***
(0.363) (0.392) (0.446)
Non-white Workers (%) -0.803* -0.614 -0.465
(0.327) (0.337) (0.424)
Error Correction Rate -4.283*** -4.222*** -4.083***
(0.265) (0.250) (0.292)
Constant Yes Yes Yes
R 2 0.145 0.144 0.141
Degrees of Freedom 43 43 43
Observations 1,226 1,226 1,226
BIC -699.086 -701.507 -525.803
Reported R 2  values do not include error corrections
Table 3. Long-Term Effects and Error Correction Rate 
Predicting Declining Union Density, 1970-2008






LONG-TERM EFFECTS AND ERROR-CORRECTION RATE PREDICITING 













ULPs -0.436*** -0.152 -0.900***
(0.079) (0.092) (0.085)
Union Losses -0.458* 1.387*** -2.005***
(0.230) (0.232) (0.292)
Productive-Firm Financialization -1.109*** -1.412*** -1.411***
(0.136) (0.114) (0.125)
Domestic Capital Fl ight 8.187*** 8.572*** 8.531***
(0.579) (0.570) (0.639)
Dom. Capital Fl ight X ET Sector -7.042*** -7.124*** -7.037***
(0.399) (0.394) (0.422)
Automation (%) 0.741*** 0.523*** 0.634***
(0.135) (0.108) (0.141)
College Educated (%) -1.835*** -1.499*** -1.586***
(0.242) (0.233) (0.263)
Female Workers (%) 1.913*** 2.175*** 1.571***
(0.324) (0.338) (0.387)
Non-white Workers (%) -1.113*** -0.999** -0.553
(0.316) (0.311) (0.383)
Error Correction Rate -3.480*** -3.475*** -3.340***
(0.235) (0.217) (0.252)
Constant Yes Yes Yes
(0.126) (0.173) (2.924)
R 2 0.164 0.161 0.159
Degrees of Freedom 43 43 43
Observations 1,226 1,226 1,226
BIC -748.356 -782.976 -654.237
Reported R 2  values do not include error corrections
Long-Term Effect and Error Correction Rate Predicting Declining Union 
Membership, 1970-2008






Acemoglu, Daron, Philippe Aghion, and Giovanni L. Violante. 2001. “Deunionization, 
Technical Change and Inequality.” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public 
Policy 55: 229-64. 
Acker, Joan. 2006. “Inequality Regimes: Gender, Class. And Race in Organizations.” Gender & 
Society 20(4): 441-64. 
Anner, Mark. 2011. Solidarity Transformed: Labor Responses to Globalization and Crisis in 
Latin America. ILR Press: Ithaca, NY. 
Aronowitz, Stanley. 2014. The Death and Life of the American Labor Movement: Toward a 
New Worker’s Movement. New York: Verso Books. 
Autor, David H., Frank Levy, and Richard J. Murname. 2003. “The Skill Content of Recent 
Technological Change: An Empirical Analysis.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
(November): 1279-1333. 
Avent-Holt, Dustin and Tomaskovic-Devey. 2014. “A Relational Theory of Earnings 
Inequality.” American Behavioral Scientist 58(3): 379-99. 
Barkin, Solomon. 1961. The Decline of the Labor Movement and What Can Be Done About It. 
Santa Barbara, CA: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. 
Batt, Rosemary. 2001. “Explaining Wage Inequality in Telecommunications Services: Customer 
Segmentation, Human Resource Practices, and Union Decline.” Industrial and Labor 





Baud, C. and C. Durand. 2012. “Financialization, Globalization, and the Making of Profits by 
Leading Retailers.” Socio-Economic Review 10(2): 241-66. 
Beck, Nathaniel. 1991. “Comparing Dynamic Specifications: The Case of Presidential 
Approval.” Political Analysis 3(1):51-87. 
Blee, Kathleen M. and Kimberly A. Creasap. 2010. “Conservative and Right-Wing Movements.” 
Annual Review of Sociology 36:225-47. 
Bluestone, Barry and Bennett Harrison. 1982. The Deindustrialization of America: Plant 
Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry. New York: 
Basic Books. 
Bok, Derek C. and John Dunlop. 1970. Labor in the American Community. Simon and Schuster: 
New York. 
Brady, David, Regina S. Baker, and Ryan Finnigan. 2013. “When Unionization Disappears: 
State-Level Unionization and Working Poverty in the United States.” American 
Sociological Review 78(5):872-96. 
Braverman, Harry. 1974. Labor and Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Brenner, Johanna. 1998. “On Gender and Class in U.S. Labor History41-53 in Rising from the 
Ashes: Labor in the Age of ‘Global Capital,’ edited by Michael Yates. Monthly Review 
Press: New York. 
Bronfenbrenner, Kate. 2009. “No Holds Barred: The Intensification of Employer Opposition to 





Bronfenbrenner, Kate and Tom Juravich. 1998. “Preparing for the Worst: Organizing and 
Staying Organized in the Public Sector.” In Organizing to Win:New Research on Union 
Strategies, edited by Kate Bronfenbrenner. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press. 
Burawoy, Michael. 1979. Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process under 
Monopoly Capitalism. Chicago: The Chicago University Press. 
Chandler, Alfred D. 1977. The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Clawson, Dan and Mary Ann Clawson. 1999. “What Happened to the US Labor Movement? 
Union Decline and Renewal.” Annual Review of Sociology 25:95-119. 
Coontz, Stephanie. 2000. The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap. 
Basic Books: New York. 
Davis, Leila E. 2014. The Financialization of the Nonfinancial Corporation in the Post-1970 U.S. 
Economy. Ph.D. Dissertation, Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 
De Boef, Suzanna and Luke Keele. 2008. “Taking Time Seriously.” American Journal of 
Political Science. 52: 184-200. 
DiMaggio, Paul J. 1988. “Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory.” Institutional Patterns and 
Organizations, Culture, and Environment 1: 3-22. 
DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powell. 1983. “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” American 





DiNardo, John, Nicole M. Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux. 1996. “Labor Market Institutions and 
the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach.” Econometrica 
64(5):1001-44. 
Dixon, Marc. 2008. “Movements, Countermovements, and Policy Adoption: The Case of Righrt-
to-Work Activism.” Social Forces 87(1): 473-500. 
Epstein, Benjamin R. and Arnold Forster. 1967. The Radical Right: Report on the John Birch 
Society and Its Allies. New York: Random House. 
Epstein, Gerald A. and Arjun Jayadev. 2005. “The Rise of Rentier Incomes in OECD Countries: 
Financialization, Central Bank Policy and Labor Solidarity.” Pp. 46-74 in 
Financialization and the World Economy, edited by Gerald A. Epstein. Elgar: 
Northampton, MA. 
Farber, Henry S. and Bruce Western. 2001. “Accounting for the Decline of Unions in the Private 
Sector, 1973-1998.” Journal of Labor Research 22(3): 459-85. 
Fiorito, Jack and Cheryl L. Maranto. 1987. “The Contemporary Decline of Union Strength.” 
Contemporary Policy Issues 5(4):12-26. 
Fletcher, Bill and Fernando Gapasin. 2008. Solidarity Divided: The Crisis in Organized Labor 
and a New Path Toward Social Justice. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Fligstein, Neil. 2002. “The Structural Transformation of American Industry, 1919-1979.” Pp. 
311-60 in Competing Capitalisms: Institutions and Economies Vol.1, edited by Richard 





Fligstein, Neil and Taekjin Shin. 2007. “Shareholder Value and the Transformation of the US 
Economy, 1984-2000.” Sociological Forum 22(4): 399-424. 
Frank, Thomas. 2003. What’s the Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the Heart of 
America. New York: Metropolitan Books. 
Freeman, Richard B. 2011. “What Can We Learn from NLRA to Create Labor Law for the 21st 
Century?” ABA Journal of Labor &Employment Law 26(2): 327-43. 
Freeman, Richard B. and Eunice Han. 2012. “The War Against Collective Bargaining in the 
U.S.” Journal of Industrial Relations 54(3):386-408. 
Freeman, Richard B. and James L. Medoff. 1984. What Do Unions Do?. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Ganz, Marshall. 2009. Why David Sometimes Wins: Leadership, Organization, and Strategy on 
the California Farm Workers.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
Georjakas, Dan and Marvin Surkin. 1975.  Detroit: I Do Mind Dying. St. Martin’s Press: New 
York. 
Getman, Julius G. 2010. Restoring the Power of Unions: It Takes a Movement. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press. 
Getman, Julius and Bertrand B. Pogrebin. 1988. Labor Relations: The Basic Processes, Law and 
Practice. Westbury, NY: Foundation Press. 
Glenn, Evelyn Nakano. 2002. Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender Shaped American 





Goldfield, Michael. 1987. The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Gordon, Joshua C. 2015. “Protecting the Unemployed: Varieties of Unionism and the Evolution 
of Unemployment Benefits and Active Labor Market Policy in the Rich Democracies.” 
Socio-Economic Review 13(1):79-99. 
Greenwood, Robin and David Scharfstein. 2013. “The Growth of Finance.” The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 27(2): 3-28. 
Gross, Neil, Thomas Medvetz, and Rupert Russell. 2013. “The Contemporary Conservative 
Movement.” Annual Review of Sociology 37: 325-54. 
Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson. 2010a. “Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political 
Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States.” Politics & 
Society 38(2):152-204. 
Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson. 2010b. Winner-Take-All Politics. New York: Simon and 
Schuster. 
Halle, David. 1984.  America’s Working Man: Work, Home, and Politics among Blu-Collar 
Property Owners. University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 
Hanley, Caroline. 2014. “Putting the Bias in Skill-Biased Technological Change? A Relational 
Perspective on White-Collar Automation at General Electric.” American Behavioral 
Scientist 58(3):400-15. 





Harvey, David. 2011. “Crises, Disruptions, and the Uneven Development of Political 
Responses.” Economic Geography 87(1): 1-22. 
Haydu, Jeffrey. 1998. “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods As Cases to Compare and As 
Sequences of Problem Solving.” American Journal of Sociology 104(2): 339-71. 
Hogler, Raymond, Steven Shulman, and Stephan Weiler. 2004. “Right-to-Work Legislation, 
Social Capital, and Variations in State Union Density.” The Review of Regional Studies 
34(1): 95-111. 
Hyman, Louis. 2012. Borrow: The American Way of Debt. New York: Vintage Books. 
Jacobs, David and Lindsey Myers. 2014. “Union Strength, Neoliberalism, and Inequality: 
Contingent Political Analyses of U.S. Income Differences since 1950.” American 
Sociological Review 79(4):752-74. 
Jamieson, Kathleen Hall and Joseph N. Capella. 2008. Echo Chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the 
Conservative Media Establishment. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Juravich, Tom. 2007. “Beating Global Capital: A Framework and Method for Union Strategic 
Corporate Research and Campaigns.” Pp. 16-39 in Global Unions: Challenging 
Transnational Capital through Cross-Border Campaigns, edited by Kate Bronfenbrenner. 
ILR Press: Ithaca, NY. 
Kerrissey, Jasmine and Evan Schofer. 2013. “Union Membership and Political Participation in 
the United States.” Social Forces 91(3): 895-928. 
Kimeldorf, Howard. 2013. “Worker Replacement Costs and Unionization: Origins of the U.S. 





Kleiner, Morris M. 2001. “Intensity of Management Resistance: Understanding the Decline of 
Unionization in the Private Sector.” Journal of Labor Research 22(3):519-40. 
Kochan, Thomas A., Harry Charles Katz, and Robert McKersie. 1986. The Transformation of 
American Industrial Relations. New York: Basic Books. 
Kornbluh, Joyce. 1988. Rebel Voices: An IWW Anthology. Charles H. Kerr Publishing: 
Chicago, IL. 
Krippner, Greta. 2005. “The Financialization of the American Economy.” Socio-Economic 
Review 3(2):173-208. 
Krippner, Greta R. 2011. Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Kristal, Tali. 2013. “The Capitalist Machine: Computerization, Workers’ Power, and the Decline 
in Labor’s Share within U.S. Industries.” American Sociological Review 78(3):361-89. 
Lafer, Gordon. 2013. “The Legislative Attack on American Wages and Labor Standards, 2011-
2012.” Economic Policy Institute. Briefing Paper No.364. 
Lasky, Marjorie Penn. 1985. “’When I Was a Person’: The Ladies’Auxilliary in the 1934 
Minneapolis Teamsters’ Strikes.” Pp. 181-205 in Women,Work, and Protest, edited by 
Ruth Milkman. Routledge & Kegan Paul: Boston, MA. 
Lin, Ken-Hou. 2013. The Rise of Finance and Firm Employment Dynamics, 1982-2005 (June 





Lin, Ken-Hou and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey. 2013. “Financialization and U.S. Income 
Inequality, 1970-2008.” American Journal of Sociology 118(5):1284-1329. 
Lubell, Samuel. 1954. The Future of American Politics. New York: Harper Publishing. 
MacKenzie, Donald and Yuval Millo. 2003. “Constructing a Market, Performing Theory: The 
Historical Sociology of a Financial Derivatives Exchange.” American Journal of 
Sociology 109(1):107-45. 
McCartin, Joseph. 2011. Collision Course: Ronald Reagan, the Air Traffic Controllers, and the 
Strike that Changed America. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Medvetz, Thomas. 2006. “The Strength of Weekly Ties: Relations of Material and Symbolic 
Exchange in the Conservative Movement.” Politics and Society 34(3):343-68. 
Metzgar, Jack. 2000. Striking Steel: Solidarity Remembered. Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press. 
Meyer, John W. and Brian Rowan. 1977. “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure As 
Myth and Ceremony.” American Journal of Sociology 83(2):340-63. 
Miller, S.M. and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey. 1983. Recapitalizing America: Alternativesto the 
Corporate Distortion of National Policy. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 






Milkman, Ruth. 1985. “Women Workers, Feminism and the Labor Movement.” Pp. 300-22 in 
Women,Work, and Protest, edited by Ruth Milkman. Routledge & Kegan Paul: Boston, 
MA. 
Milkman, Ruth. 2006. L.A. Story: Immigrant Workers and the Future of the U.S. Labor 
Movement. Russell Sage: New York. 
Milkman, Ruth. 2007. “Two Worlds of Unionism: Women and the New Labor Movement,” in 
The Sex of Class: Women Transforming American Labor, edited by Sue Dorothy. 
Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. 
Misra, Joya and Alexander Hicks. 1994. “Catholicism and Unionization in Affluent Postwar 
Democracies: Catholicism, Culture, Party, and Unionization.” American Sociological 
Review 59(2):304-26. 
Mizruchi, Mark S. 2013. The Fracrturing of the American Corporate Elite. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Mosher, James S. 2007. “U.S. Wage Inequality, Technological Change, and Decline in Union 
Power.” Politics & Society 35(2): 225–63. 
Piketty, Thomas. 2014. Capital in the 21st Century. Belknap Press: Cambridge, MA. 
Piven, Francis Fox. 2008. “Can Power from Below Change the World?” American Sociological 
Review 73(1): 1-14. 





Rao, Hayagreeva, Lori Qingyuan Yue, and Paul Ingram. 2011. “Laws of Attraction: Regulatory 
Arbitrage in the Face of Activism in Right-to-Work States.” American Sociological 
Review 76(3): 365-85. 
Reich, Robert. 2007. Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy, and 
Everyday Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Rooks, Daisy.  2003. “The Cowboy Mentality: Organizers and Occupational Commitment in the 
New Labor Movement,” Labor Studies Journal 28(3): 33-62. 
Roscigno, Vincent. 2011. “Power Revisited.” Social Forces 90(2): 349-74. 
Rosenblum, Jonathan D. 1997. Copper Crucible: How the Arizona Miners’ Strike of 1983 Recast 
Labor-Management Relations in America. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press. 
Rosenfeld, Jake. 2014. What Unions No Longer Do. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. 
Royster, Deirdre. 2003. Race and the Invisible Hand: How White Networks Exclude Black Men 
from Blue Collar Jobs. University of California Press: Berkeley, CA. 
Salzinger, Leslie. 2003. Genders in Production: Making Workers in Mexico's Global Factories. 
University of California Press: Berkeley, CA. 
Sclar, Elliot D. 2001. You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: The Economics of 
Privatization. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. 
Shaw, Randy. 2010. Beyond the Fields: Cesar Chavez, the UFW, and the Struggle for Justice in 





Silver, Beverly. 2003. Forces of Labor: Workers’ Movements since 1870. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Smith-Doerr, Laurel. 2004. Women’s Work: Gender Equality vs. Hierarchy in the Life Sciences. 
Lynne Rienner: Boulder, CO. 
Stockhammer, Engelbert. 2004. “Financialisation and the Slowdown of Accumulation.” 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 28(5):719-41. 
Strom, Sharon Hartman. 1985. “‘We’re No Kitty Foyles’: Organizing Office Workers for the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations, 1937-50.” Pp. 206-34 in Women,Work, and 
Protest, edited by Ruth Milkman. Routledge & Kegan Paul: Boston, MA. 
Tilly, Chris and  Charles Tilly. 1998. Work Under Capitalism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Tomaskovic-Devey, Donald. 2014. “The Relational Generation of Workplace Inequalities.” 
Social Currents 1(1):51-73. 
Tomaskovic-Devey, Donald and Ken-Hou Lin. 2011. “Income Dynamics, Economic Rents, and 
the Financialization of the U.S. Economy.” American Sociological Review 76(4):538-59. 
Tomaskovic Devey, Donald, Ken-Hou Lin, and Nathan Meyers. 2015. “Did Financialization 
Reduce Economic Growth?” submitted to Socio-Economic Review. 
Tope, Daniel and David Jacobs. 2009. “The Politics of Union Decline: The Contingent 






Van Arnum, Bradford M. and Michele I. Naples. 2013. “Financialization and Income Inequality 
in the United States, 1967-2010.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 
72(5):1158-82. 
Volscho T.W, and Kelly N.J. 2012. “The Rise of the Super-Rich: Power Resources, Taxes, 
Financial Markets, and the Dynamics of the Top 1 Percent, 1949 to 2008.” American 
Socioogical Review 77(5): 679–99. 
Waldinger, Roger, Chris Erickson, Ruth Milkman, Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Abel Valenzuela, Kent 
Wong, and Maurice Zeitlin. 1998. “Helots No More: A Case Study of the Justice for 
Janitors Campaign,” in Organizing to Win, edited by Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. ILR 
Press: Ithaca, NY. 
Walker, Edward T. and Christopher M. Rea. 2014. “The Political Mobilization of Firms and 
Industries.” Annual Review of Sociology 40:281-304. 
Wallace, Michael, Kevin T. Leicht, and Lawrence E. Raffalovich. 1999. “Unions, Strikes, and 
Labor’s Share of Income: A Quarterly Analysis of the United States, 1949-1992.” Social 
Science Research 28:265-88. 
Western, Bruce. 1995. “A Comparative Study of Working-Class Disorganization: Union Decline 
in Eighteen Advanced Capitalists Countries.” American Sociological Review 60(2): 179-
201. 
Western, Bruce. 1997. Between Class and Market: A Postwar Unionization in the Capitalist 





Western, Bruce and Jake Rosenfeld. 2011. “Unions, Norms, and the Rise in the U.S. Wage 
Inequality.” American Sociological Review 76(4):513-37. 
Williams, Bruce. 1987. Black Workers in an Industrial Suburb. Rutgers University: Press New 
Brunswick, NJ. 
